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Abstract
In the recent years, the importance of one’s group of peers-be that
friends, colleagues, neighbors- has been widely emphasized in the lit-
erature. In this paper, we ask whether individuals derive utility from
conformity in college enrollment and academic mobility. We propose
a new methodology in mitigating reflection and endogeneity issues in
identifying social interactions. We exploit a special institutional set-
ting, in which schools are very close to each other, allowing for students
from different schools to interact. We investigate utility spillovers from
the educational choices of students in consecutive cohorts. Spatial vari-
ation allows us to identify social interactions in groups of various sizes.
Using a new dataset that spans the universe of high school graduates,
we estimate general equilibrium effects of social interactions. We find
positive and significant externalities in the decision to enrol in college
and the decision to migrate to a different city among peers that belong
to the same social group.
Keywords: college enrollment, social interactions, mobility, geography,
reflection problem
JEL Classification: I26, J24
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1 Introduction
In the recent years the literature on the role of social interactions in eco-
nomic behavior has expanded rapidly. This doesn’t come as surprise when
one thinks the importance of those effects in every day decision-making. The
basis of decision-making though in almost every context is information. Hu-
mans are social beings and we naturally collect information through social
interactions in order to inform our goals and choices. This is even more pro-
nounced among adolescents. In developmental science, it has been widely
argued that adolescents and young adults regularly mimic the choices and
behavior of role models in their environment(Bell (1970)).
Brock and Durlauf (2001) define social interactions as the idea that an
individual’s marginal utility with respect to other individuals’ choices in his
reference group is positive. The desire to conform induces prevalent patterns
of behavior even among agents with heterogeneous tastes over externalities
from other individuals’ choices (Bernheim (1994)). Social interactions within
a reference group have been shown to affect students’ achievement. However,
there is little evidence on the effect of social interactions on the decisions
of college enrollment and academic mobility. Moreover, social interactions
can explain variation in choices across groups with similar characteristics.
For example, Schelling (1973) provide early evidence of social interactions
in binary choice in a profusion of contexts such as driving style and athletic
play. Intuitively, conformity causes social interactions to be interconnected
with neighborhood effects. Physical proximity amplifies the interplay of
utility spillovers from other agents’ choices and the combined effect becomes
area specific. In an educational context, Garner and Raudenbush (1991)
provide evidence of a positive relation between neighborhood quality and
educational attainment.
There is evidence that peers’ decision affect scholastic performance in el-
ementary, middle and high school but also during college. Hoxby (2000) ex-
amines the effect of social interaction in grade school and finds that students
who were randomly assigned to classes with students who have high read-
ing scores relative to the school and grade, received higher reading scores.
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Hanushek et al. (2003) find that peer achievement has a positive effect on
achievement growth. In particular, 0.1 standard deviation increase in peer
average achievement leads to a 0.02 increase in student’s performance. Zim-
merman (2003) examines the effect of social interaction using freshmens’
SAT score. He finds strong positive social interaction effects among room-
mates at almost all parts of the ability distribution. Cipollone and Alfonso
(2007) find strong social interactions inter alia the decision to stay longer
in school. When men were exempted from the compulsory military services
-due to an earthquake- and stayed longer in school, the graduation rates
of young women in the affected areas rose by about 2 percentage points.
Fletcher (2006) using survey data, finds strong evidence of social interac-
tions college preferences and college enrollment. Giorgi et al. (2007) find that
ones’ behavior influences the educational decision while in college, indicat-
ing the importance of social interaction even at a later stage of someone’s
academic life. Sacerdote (2011) examines social interaction effects at the
room and accommodation level where students are randomly assigned. He
does not find any significant influence of peers.
In this paper we examine the effect of social interactions on the decisions
of adolescents and young adults regarding college enrollment and academic
mobility. We use a new dataset from Greece that contains information on
exam scores, college enrollment and educational mobility for every student
in six cohorts. We exploit the particular institutional setting in Greece, in
which schools are build very close to each other. This setting allows for rich
variation of school characteristics within a relatively contained geographical
area. We exploit this exogenous variation in group characteristics over time
and space to address the endogenous nature of the social interaction groups.
The social interaction effects are defined as contextual interactions that in-
duce different mappings from individual characteristics to outcomes (Bryk
and Raudenbush (2001)). Reference groups are viewed as ecologies in which
the social backgrounds affect individual choices of otherwise similar agents
(Raudenbush and Sampson (1999)).
Similar age peers in one’s vicinity consist a natural reference group that
provide valuable and otherwise costly information, necessary in academic
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decision making. We widen the reference group and examine social interac-
tions with respect to a series of reference groups: school peers in same cohort,
school peers in different cohorts, same age students in the neighborhood and
preferacture, different age students in neighborhood and preferacture.
There are particular advantages in having the universe of high school
graduates for a country. First, we can identify general equilibrium effects
as opposed to partial equilibria with respect to specific groups of students.
Second, we are able to observe different reference groups. A student may be
affected by the decisions of same age or older peers in his school, neighbor-
hood or preferacture. We contribute to the literature by comparing the size
of the social interaction effects across distance in space and age.
Empirical analysis of social interactions on students’ decisions has been
open to question because of the difficulties in disentangling these effects
from other confounding influences.1. We use binary choice models and in-
strumental variable techniques, exploiting spatial and time variation to com-
bat potential endogeneity problems and the well known ”reflection-problem”
(Manski (1993), Manski (2000)). There are two sources of potential endo-
geneity: Self selection into social groups and common shocks that affect
every member of a social group. Reflection may arise from reverse causality
between the outcomes of members in the same groups are their decisions
are simultaneous. These challenges are standard in the social interactions
literature. The institutional setting behind our study refrains students from
endogenously select their peers in school, facilitating the validity of the iden-
tification strategy. Moreover, the geographical density of schools allows us
to define social groups wider than a student’s schoolmates. Motivating from
the idea of role modelship, we battle the simultaneity challenge by investi-
gating social interaction between peers in consecutive school cohorts.
We find positive spillover effects between one’s decision to enrol in college
and that of their peers. More specifically, the results found here indicate that
1 The existing literature that deals with identification of the social comparison effects
use either laboratory experiments (Armin and Andrea (2006)), natural experiments (Zim-
merman (2003)), quasi-experimental designs (Hoxby (2000)), or fixed effects (Hanushek
et al. (2003)
4
students who attend a high school with 10 percent more schoolmates who
enrol in college are 4.5 percent more likely to attend college. We also find
positive spillovers regarding the decision of educational mobility. Students
are 16 percent more likely to move to a different city to study if their older
peers in school do so, 10 percent more often. We find that these externalities
decrease with the size of reference group.
The policy implications of social interactions can be indirect. The skills
and resources that characterise a reference group are usually fixed. As a
consequence, an improvement in someone’s group characteristics means an
equivalent deterioration in someone else’s group attributes. Some may ar-
gue that the redistribution in favor of disadvantaged students can act as a
boost in their scholastic outcomes, when the redistribution comes from more
advantaged areas where students might depend less on their peers’ quality.
For example, Arcidiacono and Nicholson (2005) suggest that the existence
of social interaction effects supports claims against school vouchers. This is
because, the best students leaving public schools can be detrimental to the
students left behind.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the unique dataset
used and the institutional setting related to college admission. The empirical
strategy used to identify social interactions is analysed in Section 3. We
present and discuss the results in college enrollment and educational mobility
in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and Institutional Setting
2.1 How are students admitted to college
The transition from high school to post-secondary education in Greece is
based on an unusually systematic and transparent allocation of student to
university departments2 In particular, every high school student who com-
pletes the twelfth grade receives an admission score, which is the only cri-
terion for university admission and weights: (i) her performance in national
2Every tertiary education institute in Greece is public as free education is a constitu-
tional right. Degrees awarded by private colleges are not recognized by the state.
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twelfth grade exams 3 (ii) her grade twelve within school performance which
is a combined score for homework and midterm exams in each subject.
After receiving their admission scores, students are required to submit
a list of ranked choices of specific departments in universities that are rele-
vant to their twelve grade track. For example, students outside the Classics
track cannot list Law schools. Each university department generally offers
one major of bachelor degree and no minor specializations can be declared.
Every university department admits a pre-specified number of students. A
computerized system at the Ministry of Education ranks students by their
admission score and assigns the highest ranked student to her preferred
choice. It then moves to the next student and assigns her to the first de-
partment in her list in which there is an available place, and so and so
forth. In this context, students have incentives to truthfully reveal their
preferences.
University departments must enrol the students assigned to them by the
Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Education announces the score of
the last admitted student in each university department. The last admitted
students in more prestigious departments have generally higher scores in
comparison to those in less prestigious ones. Once a student admitted they
cannot transfer to a different major. College education is completely publicly
funded and every student is exempted for college fees. Private donations to
colleges are against the law.
3The twelfth grade exams are written exams administered nationally only once every
year and last from late May to early June. The exams are proctored and marked exter-
nally. Exam markers do not observe the name, school, or even the city of the student
whose paper they grade. Students usually take six component exams, with a combination
of common subjects(Language, Mathematics, Physics, Biology or History) and four com-
pulsory track-specific subjects and one elective exam. There are three tracks: Classics,
Natural Sciences and Technical Studies. The overall score is the unweighted average of
these scores. Students who fail are allowed to retake the exam the next year. In addition,
students are not allowed to take the national exams early.
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2.2 Data
For the empirical analysis we construct a unique dataset of all students
graduating from high school in Greece from 2003 to 2009. We obtain the
information from various sources:
1. Administrative data from the Hellenic Ministry of Education contain-
ing course taking information and exam grades in the final year, gen-
der, year of birth, graduation year and college admission information.
In addition, the total number of places in tertiary education in each
year is provided.
2. School specific information such as name of school, type of school
(private, public4, experimental5), geographical coordinates, name of
preferacture it belongs to6, distance to nearest college. There are 1319
high schools in Greece7.
3. The Ministry of Finance provided us with average net income infor-
mation at the postcode of the school in 2009 Euro.
4. The Ministry of Internal Affairs provided us with urban density infor-
mation. Urban areas are those with more than 20,000 inhabitants.
5. Geographical coordinates for every tertiary education institute in Greece.
There are fifty five college campuses. Not all campuses offer the same
majors.
Our analysis disentangles school peer effects from social interaction ef-
fects by exploiting variation of school characteristics within each neighbor-
hood. This is possible because of the geographical density of schools in
4Students are assigned to public schools according to a school district system
5Admission to experimental schools is based on a lottery
6There are fifty two preferactures in Greece. Preferactures are classified by the Hellenic
National Statistical Authority
7Of which, 112 are private, and 1207 public. Of those 1207 public schools, 23 are
experimental. There are no private experimental schools in Greece. 74 evening high
schools for employed people of usually older age are excluded from our analysis
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Greece. The median distance of a school from each nearest neighbouring
school is 0.32 miles.8 We use cluster analysis to define and construct neigh-
borhoods within a mile from each school. We construct 406 clusters that
cover the whole country. Every cluster is a neighborhood that contains
all twelve-grade students who attend any other high school within a mile
(1.06 miles) radius from one’s high school9. The other comparison group we
use refers to social interactions from peers in the same preferacture. In our
analysis, a preferacture contains all twelve-grade students in other neighbor-
hoods within the administrative borders of a preferacture. Figures 1 maps
all high schools and tertiary education institutes in our dataset. Distance
of each school from the nearest tertiary education institute is used as proxy
for college accessibility.
Our analysis uses information regarding characteristics and choices of
older school peers. Because of this, we use data on student cohorts from
2004 to 200910 Furthermore, our discussion of academic mobility refers to
the decisions of students to move to a different preferacture in order to
study, given they were admitted to some college. Thus, for this part, we
focus only on admitted students.11Lastly, we drop 35,808 obs. for which
the group of schoolmates overlapped perfectly with the social group of their
neighborhood. Similarly, we drop 2,433 obs. for which their neighborhood
overlapped perfectly with their preferacture social group. 12 This exclusion
allows us to compare spillover effects from social groups of various sizes. We
8Mean of distance from nearest neighbour: 1.85 miles. Standard deviation: 18.37 miles.
25th percentile:0.07 miles. 75th percentile: 0.77 miles.
9We exploit the fact that many schools were built very close to each other in most
urban settings in Greece. This is more prevalent in Attica, the region surrounding the
city of Athens, the capital of Greece. To give an example, in the cartier of Grava in
Athens, there are six high schools next to each other along with several elementary and
middle schools that form a humongous school building complex. According to the 2001
census, Attica holds around 36 percent of the total population.
10The first cohort in our sample, 2003 (size: 59,102 obs.), is used as a reference group
for the 2004 cohort.
11In the academic mobility analysis we exclude 60,356 students who did not enrol in
college.
12These observations come from 157 clusters. Thus 250 clusters remain.
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consolidate our sample by dropping observations with missing values.
Table 1 describes our pulled data across cohorts. Fifty seven percent are
females. Ninety percent of the students reside in urban areas. More than
90 % of schools are public. Although, mean postcode income among private
schools is significantly higher compared to public schools, mean national
exam score doesn’t seem to differ much. Experimental schools are in more
aﬄuent areas in comparison to other public schools as revealed by their
higher mean postcode income. The mean national exam score of students
attending experimental schools is much higher than the score achieved by
students in private or public schools. Each cluster contains on average 4
schools and 929 student observations. Each preferacture contains on average
25 schools, 9 clusters and 6,943 student observations.
3 Empirical Strategy
We exploit inter-preferacture variation in unobservables that determine so-
cial norms to explain differences in college enrollment among students with
otherwise similar characteristics. We start off my defining one’s reference
group as his same age school peers. Then, we widen the comparison group
to incorporate social interactions in the neighborhood level and social norms
in the preferacture level. We investigate the hypothesis that social or col-
lective behavior patterns drive individual preferences because agents derive
utility from conformity. Using this rich dataset, we investigate the effect
of social interactions on the decision to enrol in college using the following
regression:
1(Enrol = 1)i,s,t = α+γ
∑
i 6=j
1(Enrol = 1)j,s,t
Ns,t − 1 +δ
∑
i 6=j
Xjst
N − 1+βXi,s,t+κTt+µSs+ist
(1)
We regress the decision to enrol in college of student i from school s
and year t on the mean enrollment of his peers in school s in year t and
other controls. Our covariates include gender, admission score, dummies for
chosen track in the final year of high school, dummies for private and exper-
imental schools, a dummy for urban area, elective specialty in senior year,
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distance to nearest college campus, year dummies, logarithm of postcode
income, and year dummies.
∑
i 6=j
Xjst
N−1 is a vector of all others’ characteristics
in school s excluding student i.
The main coefficient of interest is γ, which captures how the mean en-
rollment of someone’s school peers affects his decision to enrol in college.
Initially, we employ ordinary least squares and maximum likelihood as esti-
mation methods. There are at least two sources of potential bias here: (1)
endogeneity and (2) the reflection problem (Manski (1993), Manski (2000)).
Firstly, unobserved heterogeneity that drives selection into social groups
may bias our estimates. Nevertheless, self selection of students into schools
is restricted in our setting because students are assigned to public schools13
based on geographical criteria and they cannot choose their school peers
endogenously, by construction. Therefore, social group membership is as
good as random, since it does not depend on observables.
Secondly, endogeneity may result from unobserved common group ef-
fects, such as teacher and school quality, that affect every student in a social
group and render the identification of social interactions challenging. We
contribute to the literature by mitigating the endogeneity challenge that
stems from common group shocks. We take advantage of a special institu-
tional setting with rich spatial and over time variation in school character-
istics. We use cluster analysis to construct geographical units wider than
the school district; namely neighborhoods and preferactures. Those geo-
graphical units are big enough to allow for school diversity but also compact
enough to capture common behavioral patterns in the area.
Reflection may arise because we cannot distinguish whether someone’s
action is the cause or the effect of his peers’ outcomes. In other words, one’s
decision is simultaneous with that of his peers. We battle the simultaneity
challenge by using time lagged gender composition in the school, neigh-
borhood and preferacture level, as female prevalence contributes to a less
disruptive and less violent environment. (Lavy and Schlosser (2011)) Here,
we exploit the panel aspect of our data with respect to group characteristics.
1392 % of students in our sample attend public or public experimental schools
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Estimating equation (1) using OLS will lead to biased results. In order
to address these concerns we propose the proportion of girls in someone’s
reference group in the previous period as a source of variation for mean
enrollment in college. The intuition is that an individual’s academic outcome
may be related with their gender, but not the gender composition of their
environment. This satisfies the exclusion restriction for the validity of our
instrument.
Using the proportion of girls in someone’s last year’s reference group as
an IV relies on the assumption that this proportion has no other effect on
someone’s decision to enrol in college than through its effect on last year’s
mean college enrollment and thus this year’s someone decision to enrol in
college. It is important to note that any factor affecting the proportion of
girls in all geographic units in the same way, such as a female fertility decline
17 years before, will be captured by year fixed effects and would thus not
invalidate the identification strategy.
The first stage regression is as follows:
∑ 1(Enrol = 1)g,t
Ng,t − 1 = φ+κ
∑ 1(Female = 1)g,t
Ng,t − 1 +
∑
i 6=j
Xjst
N − 1+βXi,g,t+κTt+µSs+eg,t
(2)
g ∈ {{school}, {neighborhood}, {preferacture}}
where
∑ 1(Female=1)j,t
N−1 is the proportion of females in geographical unit
g and year t. We also include school and year specific controls. The second
stage regressions are as follows:
1(Enrol = 1)igt = α+
∑
i 6=j
Xjst
N − 1 + γ
∑
i6=j
1(Enrol = 1)j,g,t
Ng,t − 1
+ βXi,g,t + κTt + µSs + ist (3)
1(Enrol = 1)igt = α+
∑
i 6=j
Xjst
N − 1 + γ
∑
i6=j
1(Enrol = 1)j,g,t−1
Ng,t−1 − 1
+ βXi,g,t + κTt + µSs + ist (4)
where 1(Enrol = 1)igt is the decision of student i in geographical unit g and
year t to enrol in college.
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Next, we turn to academic mobility. We believe that there might exist
social interaction effects in the decision to migrate. We model a person’s
decision to move to a different preferacture in order to pursue tertiary ed-
ucation, given that they were admitted to some college. This decision is
a function of the average decision in one’s environment as specified in our
regression model:
1(Migrate = 1|Enrol = 1)i,g,t = α+ γ
∑
i 6=j
1(Migrate = 1|Enrol = 1)j,g,t
Ng,t − 1
+
∑
i 6=j
Xjst
N − 1
+ βXi,g,t + κTt + µSs + ist
(5)
We use an instrumental variable approach together with school and year
fixed effects in order to estimate the effect of social interaction in the decision
of students to move to another city to attend college. Again gender compo-
sition seems a likely candidate for an instrumental variable. The proportion
of females in a geographical unit g may create an environment more condu-
sive to collective migration as exhibited by average patterns of behavior but
it has no direct effect on an individual’s decision to migrate.
The first stage regression is as follows:
∑ 1(Migrate = 1|Enrol = 1)g,t
Ng,t − 1 = φ+ κ
∑ 1(Female = 1)g,t
Ng,t − 1 + βXi,g,t +
∑
i 6=j
Xjst
N − 1
+ κTt + µSs + eg,t
(6)
g ∈ {{school}, {neighborhood}, {preferacture}}
where
∑ 1(Female=1)j,t
N−1 is the proportion of females in geographical unit g
and year t. The second stage regressions are as follows:
1(Migrate = 1|Enrol = 1)igt = α+Xβ +
∑
i 6=j
Xjst
N − 1 + γ
∑
i 6=j
1(Migrate = 1|Enrol = 1)j,g,t
Ng,t − 1
+ βXi,g,t + κTt + µSs + ist
(7)
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1(Migrate = 1|Enrol = 1)igt = α+Xβ +
∑
i 6=j
Xjst
N − 1 + γ
∑
i 6=j
1(Migrate = 1|Enrol = 1)j,g,t−1
Ng,t−1 − 1
+ βXi,g,t + κTt + µSs + ist
(8)
where 1(Migrate = 1|Enrol = 1)igt is the decision of student i in geo-
graphical unit g and year t to migrate to a different preferacture in order to
study, given she got admitted to some college.
Our main specifications are equations 4 and 8, estimated at the neigh-
borhood and preferacture level. When estimated at the geographical units
of neighborhood or preferacture, these specifications address both the en-
dogeneity and simultaneity issues. At the neighborhood level (preferacture
level), coefficient γ picks up the effect of mean behavior of one’s older peers
in his neighborhood (preferacture), on his decision to enrol in college (spec-
ification 4) and migrate to a different city (specification 8).
Potential threats to our analysis may include the following: Actual net-
works may be very different from ecologies in one’s vicinity. In addition,
social media may allow for peer effects that are independent of proximity
and render our analysis of spatial social interactions irrelevant. This is less
of a fear though as internet penetration is relatively low in Greece 14. Par-
ents, relatives and much older individuals in a student’s environment may
influence his/her academic decisions more than his/her one year older peers
in school, neighborhood or preferacture.
4 Results and Discussion
We take advantage of the rich dataset to explore the decision to enrol in
college, controlling for a series of student, school and postcode-specific char-
acteristics. Variable enrollment captures the number of available places in
tertiary education in the whole country in each student’s graduation year.
14This is more understandable when one takes into account that Greece has 227 inhab-
ited islands, most of which are quite far from the mainland and have outdated telecommu-
nications infrastructure (Ellinikos Organismos Tourismou (EOT), ”Greek islands”, April
2012).
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We also include a dummy for students who were born in the first quarter
of each year, following Angrist and Krueger (1992), who found significant
differences in school outcomes for those students. Distance to nearest college
proxies accessibility to tertiary education(Turley (2009)).
Table 2 shows linear probability model estimates for three specifications.
Specifications (1), (2), (3) model social interactions in the school, neighbor-
hood and preferacture level respectively. All coefficients of interest are pos-
itive and statistically significant, revealing strong positive externalities at
all three levels. An increase of a hundred percent in other same-age school
peer’s college enrollment, increases one’s probability of college enrollment by
8.3 percent, ceteris paribus. This effect decreases at the neighborhood and
preferacture level, as social interactions and social norms become weaker
when social groups widen. Table 4 and 3 report results using the probit and
logistic model respectively.
A common concern in estimating social interactions or peer effects is the
so-called reflection problem (Manski (1993)). In specifications (3) and (4)
we mitigate the reflection problem by considering social interactions among
students in consecutive school cohorts. Moreover, endogeneity from unob-
served group specific shocks is alleviated by exploiting within-neighborhood
and within-preferacture variation in school characteristics. Controlling for
school-related covariates, we isolate variation attributable only to social in-
teractions. To address further potential unobserved heterogeneity issues,
we employ the novel identification strategy of relying on variation in gen-
der composition to explain differences in mean college enrollment in school,
neighborhood, and preferacture level. We use an instrumental variables ap-
proach to explore social interactions in space and time. Our instrument,
gender composition, is hypothesized to affect mean college enrollment since
female-heavy school environments are found to be less disruptive and less vi-
olent (Lavy and Schlosser (2011)). Nevertheless, gender composition doesn’t
affect one’s outcome of college enrollment, ceteris paribus. This satisfies the
exclusion restriction for the validity of our instrument.
We investigate whether conformity works not only in different levels of
physical proximity but also among agents with different age. Therefore,
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we model one’s outcome as a function of the behavior pattern exhibited by
agents in the previous cohort. Tables 5 and 6 report first and second stage
estimates, respectively. Both tables distinguish between social interactions
among same-age peers and those among peers in consecutive cohorts. We
also report second stage probit model estimates in Table ??, for robustness.
Our strong first stage estimates allow us to confidently identify the causal
path of social interactions. In our setup, the proportion of girls is a strong
predictor of mean enrollment. Moreover, the model is just identified as we
have one instrumental variable and one endogenous variable. Stock and Yogo
(2002) characterize instruments to be weak not only if they lead to biased IV
results but also if hypothesis tests of IV parameters suffer from considerable
size distortions. They propose values of the Cragg and Donald (1993) min-
imum eigenvalue statistic for which a Wald test at the 5 percent level will
have an actual rejection rate of less than 10 percent. In our case the critical
value is 16.38 which is always below the first stage Cragg-Donald statistic
we find for the school, neighborhood and preferacture level regressions re-
garding college enrollment (32.01, 34.09, 30.2 respectively) and academic
mobility (582.42, 2,849, 3,594 for the school, neighborhood and preferacture
respectively).
Using the proportion of girls in one’s environment as an instrument for
mean enrollment and academic mobility, we estimate social interaction ef-
fects using 2SLS. Our first stage estimates in specification (6) indicate a
strong identification of the endogenous variable. Our second stage esti-
mates suggest positive utility spillovers through space and time, with the
size of the effect depending on the size of the reference group. Intuitively,
social interactions among students of consecutive cohorts are important, as
older peers may function as role models. We find positive and significant
spillover effects among peers in consecutive cohorts using different defini-
tions of social groups. For instance, a ten percent increase in the proportion
of students attending college a in one’s neighborhood a year before, increases
his probability of enrolling in college by 0.02 percent. Similarly, a ten per-
cent increase in the proportion of students migrating to another city the
year before, increases one’s probability of migrating to a different city by
15
0.4 percent. Students who were born in the first quarter of the calendar
year are more likely to enrol in college by 0.7 to 0.11 percentage points,
depending on specification, all else equal.
Moreover, we explore social interactions in the decision to study in a
different city. Educational mobility is suggested in the literature to be
greatly affected by social norms, labor market structure and income (Trem-
blay (2005)). We focus on those students who enrol in college between 2004
and 2009 (sample size: 320,828). Our models include controls for school,
year and area specific characteristics. We begin our analysis by estimating
specification (5) using standard OLS, probit and logit regression models.
Our estimates reveal positive social interactions among same-cohort peers
and smaller positive externalities among students in consecutive cohorts.
Our findings suggest significant positive externalities among same-cohort
students but significant smaller negative externalities among students in
consecutive cohorts. Females are found to be less likely by 1 percentage
point to move to a different city to study, all else equal. Educational mobility
is also less common among better students by 2-3 percent.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates social interactions in college enrollment and aca-
demic mobility. When social interactions are not taken into account, educa-
tional treatments may result in misallocation of resources and may fall short
of policy goals. Our results aim to inform public policies that target ability
mismatch. We use a novel dataset from Greece that contains the universe of
high school graduates from 2004 to 2009. We employ binary choice models
and instrumental variable techniques to estimate utility linkages at different
space and time levels.
We find that the choices of a person’s peers affect his decision to en-
rol in college endogeneity of social interaction groups. Our evidence sup-
ports the hypothesis that individuals derive utility from conformity, with
the size of the externality decreasing in space distance. We exploit within-
neighborhood, within-preferacture and over time variation in gender compo-
16
sition to explain differences in mean college enrollment, in order to identify
the effect of the latter on a person’s decision to enrol in college. Mean
college enrollment in school, neighborhood and preferacture level predicts
one’s probability of college enrollment, when we mitigate endogeneity based
on area, school and student characteristics. We battle reflection problem
issues by using time lagged school, neighborhood and preferacture student
gender compostion as an instrument for unobserved heterogeinity in college
enrollment, as female prevalence contributes to a less disruptive and less
violent school environment.
Our results show that one is more likely to enrol in college and move
to another city to pursue post secondary education when many of his peers
make the same choices. A ten percent increase in one’s neighborhood and
preferacture older peers’ college enrollment increases his probability of col-
lege enrollment by 0.02 and 0.3 percent, respectively. In addition, a ten
percent increase in same age peers’ college outcome increases one’s outcome
by 0.4 both in neighborhood and preferacture level.
Despite the vast literature on the topic, two crucial identification chal-
lenges remain: common correlated group effects and simultaneity. Our con-
tribution to the literature is threefold. First, using a new and rich dataset of
the universe of high school graduates in Greece, we estimate general equilib-
rium effects of social interactions in college enrollment and academic mobil-
ity. Second, we propose a new approach in alleviating challenges in identi-
fying spillover effects by using time lagged group characteristics. Third, we
provide evidence on social interactions using a special institutional setting
that allows for spatial variation of group characteristics. So far, the existing
literature on social interactions has focused almost exclusively on scholastic
performance. The only exemptions to out knowledge are Sacerdote (2011)
who identify the effect of social interactions on drinking, drug use, and
criminal behavior and Giorgi et al. (2007) who finds significant effects on
the choice of college major. While our paper has examined several important
determinants of college enrollment and the choice of college major, several
avenues of future research remain. Understanding the mechanism that un-
derlies social interactions is the next big question in the literature. Future
17
research could push forward the front of understanding the mechanism that
underlies social interactions.
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Figure 1: Map of schools
22
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Panel A: Individual Level
First quarter of birth 0.16 0.368 0 1 320,828
Female 0.567 0.495 0 1 320,828
National Exams Score 13.16 4.062 0.52 19.95 320,828
If enrolled 0.812 0.391 0 1 320,828
Mobile students 0.748 0.434 0 1 260,472
Specialty in Classics 0.365 0.481 0 1 320,828
Specialty in Natural Science 0.154 0.361 0 1 320,828
Specialty in Technical Studies 0.484 0.5 0 1 320,828
Postcode Income (Euro, 2009) 29,464 8,441 9,573 122,879 320,828
Aggregate Enrollment 60,206 6,372 52,450 68,136 320,828
Panel B: School Level
Private 0.081 0.266 0 1 1,319
Income if private (Euro, 2009) 30,575 18,378 16,085 122,879 1,319
National score if private 13.69 2.70 4.7 17.34 1,319
Experimental 0.022 0.149 0 1 1,319
Income if experimental (Euro, 2009) 29,754 14,775 17,583 74,798 1,319
National score if experimental 14.40 1.00 12.23 16.17 1,319
Public 0.89 0.31 0 1 1,319
Income if public (Euro, 2009) 19,327 5,565 9,573 74,798 1,319
National score if public 12.26 1.56 2.97 16.36 1,319
Urban 0.898 0.301 0 1 1,319
Distance to nearest college 10.871 24.083 0.105 1095.452 1,319
campus(in miles)
No of students in each school 46 34 0.16 179 1,319
Panel C: Neighborhood Level
No of schools in each neighborhood 4.449 5.014 2 35 250
No of students in each neighborhood 929.291 1,246.298 8 10,559 250
Panel C: Preferacture Level
No of schools in each preferacture 25.365 47.409 4 332 52
No of neighborhoods 9.058 19.113 1 133 52
No of students in each preferacture 6,943 15,621 502 109,096 52
Note: Data span six cohorts 2004-2009 of 60.119 students on average. Number of schools: 1319.
Among those 413 high schools are in Athens or the surrounding suburbs. The national exam score
ranges from 0 to 20. Mobile students are those who move to a different city in order to study.
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